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1. Introduction and background 
1.1 What is a mental disorder? 
Unlike somatic or neurological disease, what we call a mental disorder is 
an almost purely subjective phenomenon – a collection of feelings, thoughts, 
sensations and perceptions that exist only in one’s conscious mind.  Over the 
course of human history, various theories were developed about the nature and 
origin of these phenomena: from an imbalance of humours in the body, through 
demonic possession, to more modern ideas about biological malfunctions or 
repressions of unconscious desires (Porter, 2002).  Currently, the dominant 
account in mental health research and practice conceptualizes and categorizes 
painful or otherwise undesirable mental states into a system of disorders 
modeled on how physical illness is also understood.  On this view, depression or 
schizophrenia are seen as no different from cancer or diabetes, in that they are 
discrete forms of illness that can be diagnosed and treated – they are something 
one has, rather than something one is.  This position is reflected clearly 
throughout the most widely known tool for assessment of mental disorders for 
both research and practice purposes, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
currently in its fifth edition (“DSM-5”), produced by the American Psychiatric 
Association (“APA”).   
However, this medical model works well to explain illness only when there 
is an organic abnormality that one can trace undesirable symptoms to: a lump of 
cells that refuse to die, a malfunctioning organ, a virus invading one’s body.  For 
mental disorders, by and large, this is not the case: disturbing mental symptoms 
are not just manifestations of an underlying illness – they are the illness.  While 
research over the last few decades has increasingly clarified how such mental 
states might develop – through a complex interaction of genetic tendencies, 
social and environmental triggers, and one’s individual history and psychology – 
on reflection, these discoveries prove surprisingly unhelpful in determining 
whether the nature of these mental states is pathological.  For instance, research 
indicates that up to 40% of individual differences in mental states that comprise 
depression is attributable to genetics, with the development of such states being 
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influenced by the combined effect of a large number of genetic variants, each 
having a relatively small effect (Howard et al, 2019).  From this, one might be 
tempted to argue that, if depression is partially heritable, it must be an illness – a 
question of some unfortunate people having “bad” variants of certain genes, that 
make them particularly vulnerable to becoming depressed.  However, this would 
fail to take into account that genetics influence the development of most, if not all, 
of our mental landscape – our attitudes, beliefs and behaviors.  Political 
orientation, for example, also seems to be about 40% heritable (Dawes and 
Weinschenk, 2020), yet no one seems to be suggesting that we should send, 
say, Republicans to therapy. 
So what is it that makes a mental state disordered?  The distinguishing 
factor is not suffering, given that certain painful states (such as grief) are judged 
to be perfectly normal, while states that cause no apparent suffering to the 
“victim” at all – narcissism springs to mind here – are considered pathological.  
The DSM makes it clear that cultural context plays a large role in what is, and 
what is not, a mental disorder: “[t]he boundaries between normality and 
pathology vary across cultures for specific types of behaviors.”  Culture, we are 
told, provides the “interpretive frameworks that shape the experience and 
expression of the symptoms, signs, and behaviors that are criteria for diagnosis.”  
Certain disorders are confined to particular cultures, or may be expressed 
through different clusters of symptoms; some behaviors recognized in one 
culture as normal might be indicative of an illness in another; and so on 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013, p.14).  Thus, for instance, 
homosexuality is no longer a mental disorder, having been ejected by a 
democratic vote of the members of the APA in the 1970s from one of the earlier 
versions of the DSM (McNally, 2011, p.23). 
Ultimately, while mental suffering is undoubtedly a real phenomenon (in as 
much as any subjective experience can be), whether it or some forms of it can be 
termed an “illness,” and the status of the mental disorders into which it is 
categorized, are far more questionable.  Further, the extent to which these 
diagnostic categories reflect the subjective experiences of individual sufferers is 
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also unclear. Both phenomenological research and the fact that comorbidity (the 
co-occurrence of one disorder with another) is the rule rather than exception 
indicate that individual experience is much richer and more varied than can be 
accurately captured by the existing diagnoses, encompassing bodily, temporal 
and intersubjective dimensions that cut across diagnostic boundaries.  
Nevertheless, whatever its deficiencies, there is little doubt that some system of 
classification is needed for research purposes, to help ensure consistency in 
diagnosis and treatment, and for the sheer convenience of having a common 
language that serves as a reference point for researchers, clinicians and patients 
in sharing their experiences. It would be both difficult and awkward to 
communicate about the relevant mental phenomena without this diagnostic 
shorthand – the language of disorders and symptoms - and this paper will not 
even attempt to do so; though the fact that diagnostic labels might obscure parts 
and variety of subjective experiences they refer to, and might mislead us (at least 
partly) as to their nature, should be borne in mind. 
 
1.2 The central question and three kinds of answers 
However categorized, grouped or labeled into “disorders” the central 
question of mental suffering is this: is it a distinctive form of illness, or is it a 
constitutive part of one’s self?  Broadly speaking, there are three kinds of 
theories that try to answer this question.   
The first treats disturbing or painful mental states, or some of them, as 
disorders that disrupt or interfere with the way one’s mind is supposed to function 
when healthy.  These types of theories are broadly congruent with the medical 
model, seeking to disassociate the sufferer from the mental states in question.  
The main challenge for theorists who fall into this camp is coming up with the 
grounds upon which such dissociation should be made, particularly in absence of 
any clear physical malfunction to which the undesirable mental states can be 
traced.  One good example of a theoretical framework that accepts the absence 
of any physical abnormality as the root cause of mental distress, yet attempts to 
elucidate a distinction between normal and disordered states, is that provided by 
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Graham (2013).  He asserts that what makes a state disordered or undesirable 
can be captured by three factors: (1) the harmful or dangerous nature of the state 
in question; (2) its non-voluntary and personally uncontrollable nature; and (3) an 
inability to alter or excise it by providing addition or compensatory psychological 
resources.  Thus, it can be said that, for instance, states that comprise 
depression are disordered or undesirable because (1) they are both harmful 
(involving mental suffering and being incomprehensible to oneself) and 
dangerous (they carry the risk of suicide); (2) they are not the product of willful 
effort nor under direct or voluntary control (one cannot simply “snap out of it,” no 
matter how much one might want to); and (3) they are not abated by additional 
psychological resources, such as “special opportunities for social affiliation “ 
(Graham, 2013, pp.47-48).  I am not persuaded by this analysis, given that there 
are a number of mental states – desire for vengeance, devotion to a cause or a 
god, or even love – that can, upon reflection, easily fulfill these requirements 
without being considered mentally disordered; nor have I found any other criteria 
for making the normal/abnormal distinction any more persuasive. 
 The second kind of theoretical position – anti-psychiatry - denies that there 
is any suffering that is inherent in the relevant mental states at all.  Instead, it 
posits that labeling people mentally ill is merely the means to control and 
suppress socially divergent behavior.  On one version of this view, even 
schizophrenia is a positive development: “an inner voyage of discovery” that a 
person should be allowed to undergo undisturbed, with episodes of psychosis 
being seen “as more of a breakthrough than a breakdown” (McNally, 2011, p.18).  
This rather extreme version has always been more of a fringe view, and need not 
be seriously considered here, especially given an abundance of research that 
points to the fact that most of the mental states considered disordered are in fact 
disturbing and cause suffering to the person who experiences them.  However, 
weaker versions of this theoretical position have been an important voice of 
criticism in psychiatry, pointing out the ethically problematic nature of certain 
practices, such as involuntary confinement and treatment, inflicted upon those 
judged mentally ill on the basis of diagnoses that are, to a greater or lesser 
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extent, based on normative ideas about what a particular culture finds abnormal.  
They have also contributed to our understanding of not only how we construct 
our concepts of mental disorders, but also of how the mental states they 
represent develop: the idea that social attitudes, practices and values are crucial 
in how mental disorders arise and are experienced is now generally accepted 
(McNally, 2011, pp.18-22 and 128-158 on social causation vs. social construction 
of mental disorders).  Nevertheless, as this position generally downplays or 
outright rejects the importance of biological and psychological factors in the 
development of the relevant mental states, it is in my view not a complete or 
sufficient account of the nature of mental suffering. 
 The third type of theories about the relevant mental states views them 
primarily as part of that flow of subjective experience that human consciousness 
and selfhood are grounded in.  Such theories reflect on the intensely personal 
nature of this type of suffering, and point to the lack of any strongly principled 
basis for disassociating some painful or otherwise undesirable mental states from 
the identity of the sufferer.  Phenomenological theories that view mental 
disorders as alterations or disturbances in the modes of human experience and 
existence, relating their symptoms to “the subject and the whole of 
consciousness in which these symptoms emerge,” (Fuchs, 2010, p.548) belong 
in this category.  On this view, mental disorders consist in alterations to the basic 
structures of conscious experience, profoundly transforming the person’s sense 
of existence and self.  This transformation might still be viewed as pathological – 
an illness of the self – although this appears to be based on normative 
assumptions about what a “healthy” experience of one’s self and its relation to 
the world is, and how it ought to be constructed (for examples, see Fuchs 2010 
and Svenaeus 2014).  Aside from these normative assumptions, I consider this 
type of view broadly correct as way of conceptualizing mental suffering, and this 





1.3 Research questions and thesis 
 This paper will attempt to make a modest contribution towards answering 
the central question by examining the implications of the recent research into 
psychedelic substances and their effects on mental health.  More specifically, the 
paper will analyze the findings concerning the link between a particular state of 
consciousness reliably induced by ingestion of psychedelics – the so-called 
“mystical experience” – and long-term improvements in subjective well-being.  In 
light of this connection, the main research questions this paper will address are 
the following: 
(1) How can a mystical experience improve mental health?  In what way can it 
substantively alter the mental and phenomenal states that are considered 
disordered, in particular given its temporary nature? 
(2) What does the effect of the mystical experience on mental health, and the 
manner in which it is achieved, tell us about the nature of mental suffering 
and how it should be conceptualized? 
The central thesis for which this paper will argue is that the “self-model” of 
mental suffering better accommodates the evidence from psychedelic research 
on the effects of mystical experiences on mental health, given in particular how 
these effects are seemingly achieved: through a profound alteration in the 
conscious self. 
 
1.4 Limitations and terminology 
 The research on mental suffering and its various manifestations is vast 
and encompasses a number of fields of inquiry in addition to philosophy.  The 
parts of it that pertain specifically to psychedelics are far more limited – this type 
of research having only just recommenced in the two decades – but even so, 
they are substantial enough in volume to make summarizing them in one Master 
thesis unrealistic.  This paper will therefore consider the research on psilocybin 
as a representative example of the effects classic psychedelics have specifically 
on depression and/or anxiety.   
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 For ease of reference, this paper will utilize the standard classification and 
terminology of the mental health field.  “Mental disorder” and “mental illness” will 
be used interchangeably to refer to the types and collections of mental and 
phenomenal states that have traditionally been classified as such, whatever the 
deficiencies of that classification might be.  It should be noted here that the focus 
of this paper is on only those types of mental suffering that have no clearly 
identifiable biological cause: thus, what is meant by mental disorder or illness will 
not include symptoms or states that can be traced to a particular substance, 
hormonal deficiency, brain damage or disease, or some other such organic 
dysfunction or abnormality.  It is acknowledged that this division between the 
physical and the mental is not quite so clear-cut: but for the purposes of this 
paper, a rough-and-ready boundary will suffice and any complexities of making 
the distinction between somatic illness and mental disorder will be, for the most 
part, ignored. 
“Depression” and “anxiety” should be construed broadly, and refer to the 
respective symptomology that purports to cover the various combinations of 
mental and experiential states that may attach to each, as far as that can be 
measured by the relevant diagnostic tools.  The primary focus of this paper will 
be on depression; but as it is difficult to disentangle it from anxiety, the latter will 
also be included in the discussion.  The diagnostic categories used in this paper 
will be those of the DSM-5, and depression and anxiety will be defined by 
reference to its symptomology.  This is a reflection of the popularity of the DSM in 
research, clinical practice and even popular culture, despite its ostensive focus 
on North American society.  Further, the differences between the DSM and its 
nearest rival, the International Disease Classification (“IDC”) produced by the 
World Health Organization, are for the present purposes negligible.  
   
1.5 Materials and method 
 The primary methodology will be philosophical argumentation and 
conceptual analysis, relying on findings from empirical research and theoretical 
work in psychology and neuroscience, as well as phenomenological description.  
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DSM-5 will be utilized to anchor the discussion to a shared framework in 
research and clinical practice that provides a common reference point between 
disciplines for communicating about depression and anxiety.  
 
1.6 Structure 
 Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 will set out what is 
commonly understood by depression and anxiety: how these conditions are 
diagnosed, treated and experienced.  Chapter 3 will then focus on how 
depression and anxiety have been found to react in empirical research to 
administration psilocybin, and explore the correlation between the “mystical 
experience” that reliably occurs following ingestion of said psychedelics and 
subsequent improvements in mental health.  On the basis of Chapters 2 and 3, 
and by reference to a neuroscientific theory of consciousness, Chapter 4 will 
move on to argue that mental disorders are best understood as part of the 
sufferer’s conscious self, given that it is an alteration in consciousness and its 
integration into one’s sense of self that appear to be key to the therapeutic effect. 
Finally, Chapter 5 will offer a brief conclusion to the paper and propose some 
directions for further research. 
 
2. The case of depression and anxiety. 
 What does it mean to be depressed and anxious? For many sufferers, 
their quest to understand what is happening to them starts not with the onset of 
their symptoms, but rather with their first attempt to seek professional help and 
treatment – often only after they had already suffered for months, if not years, on 
a constant or recurring basis.  The first explanatory framework most will 
encounter – usually through their primary care physician – will be the medical 
model: their doctor might ask them to describe how they’re feeling, consult the 
relevant diagnostic checklists, and offer a prescription for anti-depressants or a 
referral for a course of therapy.  This, for the lucky few, might be it: the drugs or 
the therapy will lift their mood, and they might come to view their depression as 
merely a passing illness.  But for the majority, this initial encounter will mark the 
	 11	
beginning of a lifetime of frustration and disappointment, as available treatments 
fail, result in side effects that substantially lower one’s quality of life, and 
ultimately prove ineffective in preventing a recurrence or relapse. 
 For the most part, the medical model is unable to explain these failures, or 
offer more than a temporary relief in symptoms.  However, the understanding of 
mental suffering for most sufferers – and for most professionals – starts with and 
develops from that model.  Its diagnoses and symptomology are also the 
standard reference point for research, including the research that will be 
examined in the next chapter.  The remainder of this chapter will therefore aim to 
set out the basics of diagnosing and treating depression and anxiety as distinct 
forms of mental illness; before briefly discussing a more complex reality that 
underpins this system. 
 
2.1 Depression and anxiety as distinct forms of mental illness 
2.1.1 Depression: diagnosis and treatment 
 The DSM-5 sub-categorizes depression into eight separate disorders; but 
when researchers and clinicians talk about “depression” they are normally 
referring to major depressive disorder (“MDD”), so that the remaining categories 
could be seen as variations on MDD.  Thus, for instance, dysthymia (persistent 
depressive disorder) – one of the other diagnoses in the depressive disorders 
category – has the same symptoms as MDD, and is diagnosed in almost the 
same way, except for the fact that the symptoms must be less severe and 
chronic (persisting for two years or more) to distinguish it from MDD.  Some of 
the other variants are situational, or attempt to classify clinically significant 
presentations of depressive symptoms that nevertheless may not warrant the full 
diagnosis of MDD.  According to the DSM-5, “[t]he common feature of all of these 
disorders is the presence of sad, empty, or irritable mood, accompanied by 
somatic and cognitive changes that significantly affect the individual’s capacity to 
function.  What differs among them are issues of duration, timing, or presumed 
etiology.” (American Psychiatric Association, 2013, p.155) 
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 To be diagnosed with depression (MDD), the individual concerned must 
report experiencing five or more of the following symptoms over the course of the 
same two weeks minimum: (1) depressed mood most of the day, nearly every 
day; (2) markedly diminished interest or pleasure in all, or almost all, activities 
most of the day, nearly every day; (3) significant weight loss when not dieting or 
weight gain, or decrease or increase in appetite nearly every day; (4) insomnia or 
hypersomnia nearly every day; (5) psychomotor agitation or retardation nearly 
every day (observable by others, not merely subjective feelings of restlessness 
or being slowed down); (6) fatigue or loss of energy nearly every day; (7) feelings 
of worthlessness or excessive or inappropriate guilt nearly every day (not merely 
self-reproach or guilt about being sick); (8) diminished ability to think or 
concentrate, or indecisiveness, nearly every day (either by subjective account or 
as observed by others); and/or (9) recurrent thoughts of death (not just fear of 
dying), recurrent suicidal ideation without a specific plan, or a suicide attempt or 
a specific plan for committing suicide (American Psychiatric Association, 2013, 
pp.160-161). 
 Leading interventions for depression are cognitive behavioral therapy 
(“CBT”) and anti-depressant medication.  CBT treatment is normally delivered in 
16-20 sessions, spread over three to four months, and consists of teaching 
patients “compensatory skills and different ways of thinking to reduce the 
symptoms of and their own vulnerability to MDD” (Wells and Fisher, 2016, p.65). 
Research estimated that around 41% of patients who complete this course of 
treatment “have reliably lower scores [on the scales that measure the severity of 
symptoms] than those expected from the waitlist and placebo groups” (Wells and 
Fisher, 2016, pp.65-69).  However, reduction in symptoms does not imply full 
remission – only between 17-25% of patients are asymptomatic when treatment 
finishes. Secondly, within two years, around 54% of patients successfully treated 
with CBT have been shown to relapse, although the rate of relapse can be 
lowered as long as the patient enters into and maintains some form of 
“continuation” treatment (Wells and Fisher, 2016, pp.69-76). 
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 Psychoactive drugs – anti-depressants – are an alternative to therapy 
considered to be equally efficacious, although the exact method by which they 
achieve their effects remains something of a mystery (Wells and Fisher, 2016, 
pp.87-88). Estimates of their efficacy vary, but by most accounts, anti-
depressants appear to be roughly as effective as therapy in reducing symptoms 
of depression – modern research estimates that around 40% of patients will have 
a therapeutically significant response to this type of treatment.  However, the 
placebo effect accounts for much of this improvement: around 30% of patients 
will also get better given a placebo, rather than an active anti-depressant 
compound (Khan and Brown, 2015, p.294-295).   This has led to some soul-
searching in the medical profession, given that – unlike therapy – anti-
depressants come with a whole host of unpleasant and dangerous side effects, 
including (but not limited to) nausea, diarrhea, insomnia, weight gain, sexual 
dysfunction, and an increased risk of suicide: with these symptoms appearing 
weeks before any anti-depressant benefit can be expected.  Further, in order to 
maintain any benefit gained, the drugs must be continued over a 4-12 month 
maintenance phase (or longer), once the patient enters remission: even so, the 
risk of relapse in the 6 to 12 month period once the drugs are discontinued is 
quite high (Wells and Fisher, 2016, pp.98-101). Finally, anti-depressants appear 
to cause physical dependency, in that their discontinuation causes physical and 
psychological withdrawal symptoms to appear. These can be quite severe – from 
headaches, fatigue, dizziness and nausea, through anxiety, depression and 
insomnia, to (albeit rarely) psychosis and suicide - and must be managed by 
tapering off, preferably over a period of months (Horowitz and Taylor, 2019; see 
also Hengartner et al, 2020, for an analysis of accounts of protracted withdrawal 
syndrome extracted from a peer-support internet forum). 
For those patients who do not respond to either therapy or anti-
depressants – alone or in combination – there are essentially two remaining 
options: electroconvulsive therapy (“ECT”) and vagal nerve stimulation (“VNS”).  
ECT is exactly what it sounds like: under general anesthesia, an electric current 
is applied to one’s brain, triggering a brief (less than 60 second) seizure.  No one 
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really knows why this works to relieve symptoms of an otherwise treatment-
resistant depression, but after a course of such treatments (usually six), around 
48% of patients go into remission (Jelovac et al, 2013, p.2468).  Unfortunately, 
the relief is fairly short-lived for many: around 50% of successfully treated 
patients relapse within the first year, most within the first six months; this is 
despite the fact that virtually all patients treated with ECT are now given 
continuation treatment (a course of anti-depressants or further ECT: Jelovac et 
al, 2013, pp.2469-2472).  As for VNS, it involves electrical impulses being 
applied to the vagus nerve via a small generator surgically inserted in one’s chest 
and connected to an electrode wrapped around the vagus nerve in the neck.  
This is postulated to achieve an antidepressant effect through stimulation of 
monoamine centers in the brainstem and/or certain brain regions involved in 
mood regulation (Wells and Fisher, 2016, p.102).  In patients with chronic or 
treatment resistant depression, the VNS results in improvement or remission of 
symptoms for around 15%.  However, it would appear that the success of both 
therapies may once again be partly due to placebo: 30% of people subjected to 
“sham” ECT and 10% of those implanted with an inactive VNS also experience 
improvement comparable to those who receive the active versions of these 
treatments (Khan and Brown, 2015, pp.296-297). 
 
2.1.2 Anxiety: diagnosis and treatment 
 Much as is the case with depression, anxiety comes in several subtypes, 
which, according to DSM-5 have two common features: (1) excessive fear (the 
emotional response to a real or perceived threat) and/or anxiety (anticipation of a 
future threat); and (2) related behavioral disturbances.  Anxiety disorders are 
differentiated primarily by the “types of objects or situations that induce fear, 
anxiety, or avoidance behavior, and the associated cognitive ideation…the types 
of situations that are feared or avoided and the content of the associated 
thoughts or beliefs” (American Psychiatric Association, 2013, p.189).  However, 
anxiety does not necessarily need a specific focus – generalized anxiety disorder 
(“GAD”) is characterized by excessive and difficult to control anxiety and worry 
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about any number of events or activities, which persists for at least six months 
during which it occurs more days than not.  To be diagnosed with GAD, the 
individual must also exhibit three of the following symptoms during the relevant 
time period: (1) restlessness or feeling keyed up or on edge; (2) being easily 
fatigued; (3) difficulty concentrating or mind going blank; (4) irritability; (5) muscle 
tension; and (6) sleep disturbance (American Psychiatric Association, 2013, 
pp.222 and 225). 
 The primary treatment for anxiety – GAD in particular – is virtually the 
same as that for depression: first-line treatments are therapy (specifically, CBT) 
and anti-depressants. CBT treatment in relation to anxiety focuses on providing 
information about anxiety to patients, along with “instruction in self-monitoring of 
anxiety, relaxation training, imaginal relaxation, cognitive therapy, worry behavior 
prevention, problem solving, and gradual exposure to anxiety-provoking stimuli,” 
typically in a 12-week course (Simpson et al, 2010, p.297). As with depression, 
both therapy and anti-depressants have been shown to be equally effective in 
randomized controlled clinical trials, with around half of patients having some 
response to each.  A further pharmacological option is also available for anxiety: 
benzodiazepines, such as diazepam (Valium) or alprazolam (Xanax).  These are 
essentially tranquilizers – they inhibit the ability of neurons to become excited, 
slowing down activity in the brain and nervous system, thus producing a 
sedative, relaxing effect.  Needless to say, this works very well; unfortunately, 
their “slowing down” effect results in psychomotor impairment, as well as 
impairment of higher brain functions such as learning and memory, and 
increased risks of accident and injury (Lader, 2011, pp.2088-2089).  Further, 
tolerance to benzodiazepines can develop, requiring larger doses, with cessation 
comes the return of symptoms and/or withdrawal, and the drugs can easily be 
fatal in overdose or when consumed with other sedatives (such as alcohol) – 
which is why they are not generally recommended for long term use, unless anti-
depressants prove ineffective.  Safer anxiolytic (non-antidepressant) alternatives 
to benzodiazepines – such as buspirol – have proven to be far less effective 
(Simpson et al, 2010, p.298). 
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2.2 Depression/anxiety: comorbidity 
 While the DSM-5 places anxiety and depression into two separate 
categories, that distinction appears to have little to do with the reality of how the 
mental states that are considered indicative of the two actually manifest for, and 
are experienced by, individual sufferers.  It is quite rare for patients to describe 
symptoms that can only be characterized as either depression or anxiety with 
any degree of confidence: usually, a variety of undesirable mental states is 
experienced, some of which – together with accompanying circumstances – can 
be matched to more than one diagnosis.  Thus, for instance, 58% of people 
diagnosed with MDD will also at some point receive a diagnosis of an anxiety 
disorder, and conversely 58% people with GAD will also be diagnosed with MDD 
during their lifetime (Simpson et al, 2010, pp.90-91; both are also highly 
comorbid with other sub-categories of depression and anxiety, as well as bipolar 
disorder).  Further, DSM-5 gives diagnosticians the option to diagnose 
depression with “associated features” or specifiers, one of which is “anxious 
distress.”  In this way, a single diagnosis of depression can be made (“MDD with 
anxious distress”), that also accounts for mild to severe symptoms of anxiety 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013, p.184).   
Anxiety and depression co-occur to such an extent that a good case could 
be made that their collective symptoms cannot – or should not – be separated 
into discrete disorders: the previous edition of the DSM, the DSM-IV, did in fact 
include a diagnosis of “anxious depression” that, to a certain extent, reflected this 
line of thought.  Lending strength to this idea is the fact that both respond in 
roughly equal measure to virtually identical treatment; as well as the finding – in 
the more general body of research on emotions – indicating that, even by 
reference to established checklists of symptoms, many people are either unable 
or unwilling to distinguish between feeling anxious and feeling depressed, and 
rarely report feeling symptoms indicative of just one of these in isolation.  The 
jumble of mental and phenomenal states that form each sufferer’s unique 
subjective experience might be, at least for some, difficult to disentangle and 
identify as anything other than “unpleasant” (see Feldman Barrett, 2017, 
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Loc.161-178 on the differences in how subjects experience and are able to 
differentiate between different emotions).   
 
2.3 The phenomenology of depression/anxiety: 
Part of the problem, as some phenomenologists have pointed out, might 
be that the spectrum of subjective experience of the kind of misery that might get 
classified as depression or anxiety is far more varied and encompasses more 
than the DSM-5 symptomologies are able to accommodate.  The kind of 
experience that may be compatible with the DSM diagnosis of MDD involves “a 
qualitative shift in the overall structure of experience, encompassing self, agency, 
the body, temporal experience, interpersonal relations, and the sense of being 
rooted in the world.” Aspects of this shift may be indescribable and ineffable, with 
many sufferers finding the “the metaphors they appeal to” to describe it 
“ultimately inadequate to the task.” (Ratcliffe et al, 2014, p.v)   
This richer account of depression contains embodied, intersubjective, and 
temporal dimensions.  The sufferer’s experience of the lived body, for instance, is 
often described as typified by “heaviness, exhaustion, oppression, and general 
constriction,” resulting in the body being experienced “no longer as a transparent 
medium of one’s relation to the world but rather as a burden or an obstacle” 
(Fuchs, 2019, p.621; the phenomenon described is one that Fuchs calls 
“reification” or “corporealization,” though it can also be thought of as “hyper-
embodiment” in contrast to the disembodied states one might experience in 
schizophrenia).  Intertwined with reification, the subjective perception of time can 
also become altered: time slows down, and the patient may feel (as one person 
described it) as if their inner clock is standing still, “while the clocks of the others 
run on,” making the patient “unable to move forward,” as if paralyzed.  This may 
put them out of tune with others with whom they interact – unable to respond in 
synch to the gestures, facial expressions and gazes that normally form part of 
intersubjective communication – leaving them “no longer capable of being moved 
and affected by things, situations, or other persons, even their relatives.”  As well 
as affecting the intersubjective present, the slowing down of subjective time can 
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make it harder to generate any volition towards or anticipation of the future, 
leaving the person at the mercy of their past – unable to move on, endlessly 
regretting past mistakes and opportunities that were lost to their apathy (Fuchs, 
2019, p.622-4).   
Evocative illustrations of these states of hyper-embodiment, emotional 
flatness, and profound disconnection from the world and other persons can 
sometimes be found in patient and autobiographical accounts of depression.  
Andrew Solomon (2001) for instance describes as part of his experience, “a loss 
of feeling, a numbness” that “had infected all of [his] human relations;” an inability 
to care about love, his work, family or friends; finding “all strong emotions gone, 
except for a certain nagging anxiety.”  His ability to feel pleasure evaporated to 
the point where “in erotic circumstances, [his] mind kept drifting off to shopping 
lists and work [he] needed to do;” he could not connect with his friends, and their 
own attempts to reach out to him – leaving messages on his answering machine, 
to which he felt he should respond – became a burden, an “impossible weight,” 
rather than a source of support.  Time slowed down:  
…depression minutes are like dog years, based on some artificial notion 
of time…When you are depressed, the past and future are absorbed 
entirely by the present moment…You cannot remember a time when you 
felt better, at least not clearly; and you certainly cannot imagine a future 
time when you will feel better.  Being upset, even profoundly upset, is a 
temporal experience, while depression is atemporal.  (Solomon, 2001, 
p.45-46, 53-54).   
 
Other sufferers describe feeling that their life “contracts” – as if the world, one’s 
life, and things that once made it meaningful become inaccessible.  Everything 
becomes a challenge: holding a conversation, getting dressed, having a shower, 
or even getting out of bed, with “routine tasks” like cooking or making tea 
beginning to “require enormous efforts.”  The body becomes “leaden,” “tired, 
heavy, unresponsive;” turning into an obstacle or a trap that isolates them “from 
formerly meaningful surroundings” (Slaby et al, 2014, pp.27-32, citing personal 
accounts of respondents to a 2011 research survey).  As one writer put it: 
Sometimes I felt like some creature caught in a net, thrashing around and 
unable to get free.  I didn’t know what the net was, but I knew it was there; 
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I didn’t know what was standing between me and deep connections with 
other people, but that was there too.  I felt it distinctly.  It was a wall…I 
couldn’t get around it, or over it.  It was just there. (Thompson, 1995, p.89 
in Slaby et al, 2014, p.31) 
 
Slaby et al (2014) link the changes in time and bodily experience to the 
anxiety that so often accompanies – or is perhaps a part of – depression, in that 
they note that the “altered experience of time can give rise to violent feelings of 
dread and despair…regularly reported by depressed persons.”  Because they are 
unable to act to regain meaningful connections with their lives or other people, 
they remain tied to the state of affairs in the present moment – but not, as the 
authors say, in the sense of “a blissful absorption,” but rather in what Heidegger 
called “a standing now,” a state of affairs typified by a “profound boredom,” which 
is “a wasteland of lost meaning, a desert of senseless existence that has totally 
transformed all of the temporal dimensions, past, present, and future.”  From 
there, the sufferer may fearfully anticipate more of the same or worse: their 
sense of the future being characterized by “impending disaster and doom, 
leading them to expect the future to bring only more pain and misfortune, or even 
outright catastrophe.”  Thus, respondents to a 2011 research survey reported 
feeling under threat, “like something bad will happen;” being “paranoid and 
pessimistic, convinced something bad will happen to me or others; or asserting 
that “[t]here are lots of threats in the world and they all seem to be about to 
happen, or be very likely they will happen” (Slaby et al, 2014, p.33-34).  A 
separate account of anxiety – in an essay by a philosopher who suffers from it – 
portrays this sense of impending threat as an even more essential part of his 
everyday perspective, one that co-constructs the world he inhabits.  It is, he says,  
“all at once, a fever and an occupation, an affliction and a constitution…a 
lens through which to view the world, a coloration that grants the sufferer’s 
experiences their distinctive hue…Things and persons and events fall into 
focus depending on their interactions with our anxieties: that man in the 
corner becomes threatening, this chair becomes unstable and 
unbalanced, that food becomes the agent of a fatal illness, my family – my 




 Depression and/or anxiety on a more phenomenological account – both as 
investigated by scholars and described in the accounts of sufferers – are thus not 
only the cognitive and behavioral problems that the DSM symptomology portrays 
them as.  Rather, they appear to be much more complex phenomena that affect, 
or even help to construct, the sufferer’s entire sense of being – the way they 
perceive the world, time and other people, as well as their experience of their 
embodied self – resulting in subjective experiences that are unique to the 
individual sufferer, even as they partake in the common features described 
above.   
 
3. Depression/anxiety in psychedelic research 
 Following on from the discussion above, this chapter will examine the 
recent discoveries concerning the effect that psychedelics might have on mental 
health, specifically on the mental and phenomenal states that constitute 
depression and/or anxiety.  It will start with a brief discussion of what is meant by 
“psychedelics,” and the research that has been conducted on these substances 
in the past; before moving on to summarizing modern research on psilocybin 
specifically; and finally, examining the role that a particular form of an altered 
state of consciousness – the so-called mystical experience – plays in alleviating 
symptoms of depression/anxiety.  This will lead into the discussion of what 
conclusions can be drawn about the nature of depression/anxiety from the 
therapeutic effect of mystical experiences. 
 
3.1 Psychedelics: definition and a brief research history 
In general, “psychedelic substances” or “psychedelics” are those 
substances, both natural and artificial, that significantly alter one’s experience 
and perception of reality.  A more precise definition can be a matter of some 
disagreement given the widely varying pharmacological effects of substances 
that could conceivably be embraced within this category – from alcohol through 
hallucinogens to even coffee – but one of the best and most comprehensive 
descriptions of the class of substances this paper is concerned with can be found 
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in Grinspoon and Bakalar, 1979, p.9: a psychedelic is a “drug which, without 
causing physical addiction, craving, major physiological disturbances, delirium, 
disorientation, or amnesia, more or less reliably produces thought, mood, and 
perceptual changes otherwise rarely experienced except in dreams, 
contemplative and religious exaltation, flashes of vivid involuntary memory, and 
acute psychosis.”  Within this class, two general types of drugs can be 
accommodated, distinguished by the structural category of their psychoactive 
agent: tryptamine-type drugs, such as psilocybin (the active component of “magic 
mushrooms”), lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD), and dimethyltryptamine (DMT); 
and the phenethylamine-type, including mescaline, the main psychoactive 
ingredient of peyote. While other compounds - mainly cannabinoids, ketamine 
and methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA or “ecstasy,” as it is more 
commonly known) – are frequently labeled “psychedelic” and have also aroused 
considerable research interest, their effects only partially resemble those that are 
generally agreed to be the “classic” psychedelic substances (Johnson et al, 
2019, p.84).  
 The use of psychedelic substances by human cultures has an ancient 
pedigree, with evidence for ritual importance of psychoactive compounds in a 
number of cultures around the world dating back to at least 6000 BCE (see for 
instance, Akers et al, 2011 and Guerra-Doce, 2015).  However, until the late 19th 
century, such use appears to have been exclusive to religious and/or healing 
practices of indigenous societies. Experimental research on these substances 
can only be traced back to the discovery of peyote by North American and 
European scholars in the 1890s, starting with Arthur Heffter’s isolation of 
mescaline as its active component in 1897 (Johnson et al, 2019, p.85), and the 
first report of the effects of its ingestion published in the British Medical Journal 
(Mitchell, 1896).  Research interest – specifically concerning the potential 
therapeutic application of psychedelics in psychiatry - picked up significantly 
following Albert Hoffman’s discovery of the psychoactive effects of LSD in 1943 
(a compound he had first synthesized in 1938), through first accidental then 
deliberate self-experimentation (Hoffman, 2013, pp.18-21).   
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 The 1950s and 1960s, as well as the early 1970s, witnessed the 
accumulation of promising research showing the effectiveness of psychedelic 
substances in alleviating psychological distress (particularly end-of-life and 
cancer-related) and treating addiction (Johnson et al, 2019, p.85).  Unfortunately, 
beginning in mid-1960s in the United States, the backlash against the 
recreational uses of these substances resulted in drug control laws that rendered 
them increasingly illegal.  The drive towards criminalization culminated in the 
1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances adopted by the United Nations, 
which placed psychedelics in the same category as harmful drugs that have no 
therapeutic use (such as heroin) – contrary to all of the scientific evidence 
available at the time of this classification.  As a result, nearly all scientific 
investigation into psychedelic substances ceased for decades, with the earlier 
research concerning their efficacy against mental distress essentially being 
forgotten. 
This hiatus ended in 2000, when Dr. Ronald Griffiths at Johns Hopkins 
University managed to obtain regulatory approval to work with psychedelic 
substances.  The result of his subsequent work was a landmark study, published 
in 2006, on the safety and enduring positive mental health effects of psilocybin 
use (Griffiths et al, 2006).  Thirty volunteer adults who had never taken any 
psychedelics before, but who regularly participated in religious or spiritual 
activities, were administered two to three doses of psilocybin at two-month 
intervals.  The participants reported a general improvement in their attitudes and 
behaviors following their psychedelic experiences; but more significantly, 67% of 
the subjects rated their psychedelic experience as either the most meaningful or 
one of the five most meaningful experiences of their lives – comparable to the 
birth of their first child or the death of a parent.  These results kicked off what 
became known as a “psychedelic renaissance” in mental health research: at the 
moment, all of the classic psychedelics, as well as psychedelic-adjacent 
substances such as MDMA, cannabis and ketamine, are being studied with some 
intensity for their potential in treating a number of conditions (in addition to 
depression and anxiety) – from addiction, through PTSD and anorexia to cluster 
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headaches, Alzheimers and inflammation. The following section will examine the 
research concerning the efficacy of psilocybin in alleviating symptoms of 
depression and anxiety, and discuss how these effects may be achieved in the 
course of the drug’s operation. 
  
3.2 Psilocybin in the treatment of depression/anxiety 
3.2.1 Research so far: 
  When administered in supportive settings, psilocybin has been shown in 
clinical trials to have a significant and lasting anti-depressant and anxiolytic 
effects, in both healthy volunteers and subjects diagnosed with 
depression/anxiety type disorders.  In particular, psilocybin has been shown 
effective in three groups of depressed/anxious persons: those with a diagnosis of 
life-threatening or advanced stage cancer who meet the criteria for 
depression/anxiety (as measured by standard diagnostic scales); patients with 
treatment resistant MDD; and those diagnosed with MDD.   
In relation to cancer patients, a recent meta-analysis (Castro Santos and 
Gama Marques, 2021), examined the results of three randomized, double blind, 
and placebo controlled studies that together administered high-doses of 
psilocybin to 92 subjects.  Results indicated immediate and enduring anti-
depressant and anxiolytic effects in majority of the patients, persisting for up to 
six months (the longest period of follow up). No serious or enduring adverse 
effects were reported in any of the studies. The study with the shortest follow up 
(five weeks), reported that 92% of patients given a high dose of psilocybin had a 
clinically significant anti-depressant response (defined as a 50% or greater 
reduction in symptoms measured by the relevant diagnostic scales) at that time, 
as compared to 32% of those given the placebo (a low dose of psilocybin), with 
symptom remission reported for 60% of the high-dose group and 16% for 
placebo.  In terms of anxiety, 76% of patients in the high-dose group reported a 
clinically significant response and 52% went into remission, as compared to 24% 
and 12% respectively in the placebo group.  In another study, at seven weeks, 
83% of patients in the psilocybin group had a clinically significant anti-depressant 
	 24	
response, with 85% going into remission; as compared to 14% and 15% 
respectively in the placebo group (given niacin).  The clinically significant 
response for anxiety was 58% in the psilocybin group versus 14% in the placebo 
group (Castro Santos and Gama Marques, 2021, pp.2 and 6). 
Only the smallest study (12 patients) reported depression score reduction 
at six months – the eight patients who completed the follow up reported a mean 
reduction from baseline of around 45%.  However, the two larger studies 
included a crossover (where the patients given placebo in the first round were 
later given an active dose of psilocybin), and for one of them, a long-term follow 
up study was recently published (Agin-Liebes et al, 2020).  Of the 29 patients in 
the original study, 16 were still alive at the time of the subsequent study and 15 
agreed to participate (although one of them died from cancer-related 
complications during the follow-up period).  Two long term follow-up (“LTFU”) 
assessments were carried out, at an average of 3.2 years and 4.5 years from the 
participants’ ingestion of psilocybin in the original trial.  “At the second LTFU 
point, 57% of participants showed a clinically significant anxiolytic response,” 
while 71% reported “clinically significant reductions in global psychological 
distress” on the diagnostic scale that combines measures for anxiety and 
depression.  In addition, “percentages of clinical responses for 
depression…ranged from 57-79% and depression symptom remission rates 
ranged from 50-79%.”  In terms of secondary outcomes, patients reported 
“significant reductions in hopelessness, demoralization and death 
anxiety…relative to baseline”  (Agin-Liebes et al, 2020, p.159). 
In relation to treatment-resistant depression, Castro Santos and Gama 
Marques’ meta-analysis looked at two small open-label studies, in which the 
second was essentially the follow-up to the first with an increased number of 
participants.  The first study administered two doses of psilocybin (low dose first, 
then a high dose seven days later) to twelve patients with moderate to severe 
MDD who have shown no improvement after two “adequate course of 
antidepressants from distinct pharmacological classes.”  Follow up assessments 
were carried out at one, two, three and five weeks, as well as three months.  “All 
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patients showed reduced depression severity 1 week…and 3 months…after the 
high dose session, in comparison to baseline…8 patients achieved complete 
remission 1 week after treatment.  Furthermore, 7 patients continued to meet 
criteria for response (defined as a 50% BDI – Beck Depression Inventory - score 
reduction vs baseline) 3 months after treatment, from which 5 were still in 
remission at this point.”  Anxiety scores for these patients were also significantly 
reduced. (Castro Santos and Gama Marques, 2021, p.6). In the follow-up study, 
the sample size increased to twenty patients, of whom 19 completed all 
assessments.  In this group (which included the original twelve from the first 
study), 18 met the criteria for severe or very severe depression; the mean of 
lifetime failed medication was 4.6 (with a maximum of 11); and the mean duration 
of depression was 17.7 years, with the range of 7 to 30 years.  Of the 19 patients 
who completed the assessments, “all showed some reduction in depression 
severity at 1 week and these were sustained in the majority for 3-5 weeks,” 
based on a variety of measures.  For instance, on the BDI measure, the mean 
baseline prior to treatment was 34.5; at one week, the mean reported score was 
11.8 (a reduction of 22.7), though it then increased to 19.2 at three months and 
19.5 at six months.  Scores on the suicide part of the measures were also 
significantly reduced, with 16 of the 19 patients scoring zero at one week post 
treatment (Carthart-Harris et al, 2018; Castro Santos and Gama Marques, 2021, 
p.6). 
It should be noted that ten of the patients were still, based on their scores, 
depressed following treatment – albeit not severely, as on the BDI, scores from 
10 to 18 indicate mild to moderate depression, with 19 to 29 being moderate to 
severe and over 30 indicating severe depression.  Only nine of the patients went 
into remission (with scores below even the mild depression threshold), with six of 
them maintaining that response at the six month follow up.  Carthart-Harris et al 
also note that some of the patients started additional treatment at around the 
three-month mark: six went on a new course of antidepressants after that point, 
five received psychotherapy shortly before or after, and five enterprising souls 
managed to get their hands on more psilocybin (“without sanction from the study 
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team”) between the three-month and six-month follow up.  Even so, given the 
severity of depression and treatment resistance in this group, these results are 
quite promising; with the rate of relapse no worse than could be expected from 
conventional treatments supported by a maintenance phase.  Further, in a follow 
up, semi-structured interview, all twenty patients considered their psychedelic 
experience preferable to all other kinds of treatment they have previously tried 
(Watts et al, 2017, pp.526, 542-553). 
With regards to MDD, a randomized and waiting list controlled trial with 24 
participants diagnosed with moderate to severe MDD was recently published, 
documenting “substantial rapid and enduring antidepressant effects of psilocybin-
assisted therapy.” One week after the psilocybin session, 71% of participants 
(17) retained a clinically significant response (equal or greater to a 50% reduction 
in the measurement score), and this was maintained at four-week follow up; with 
58% of participants (14) meeting the criteria for remission at week one and 54% 
(13) at week four.  The authors note that this decrease in depression measures 
from baseline occurred within a day of treatment (when it was first assessed), 
with no serious adverse effects for the participants.  The anxiolytic effects were 
also noted to be significant (Davis et al, 2021, p.486). 
 
3.2.2 Comments on the research so far: 
There is no doubt that more research is needed: the studies summarized 
above together encompass only 136 subjects, and it is possible that in larger and 
more varied participant samples, the effect size might diminish.  However, 
viewed in the larger context of research on tryptamine-type psychedelics (to 
which psilocybin belongs, and which have very similar effects and mechanisms 
of action), there are three reasons why the results might be expected to hold in 
larger populations.  Firstly, the results from psilocybin studies are congruent with 
both earlier and modern research on LSD and Ayahuasca (a traditional 
ceremonial brew with DMT as the active ingredient), in which LSD was found to 
be effective for depression/anxiety related to a diagnosis of life-threatening 
disease, and Ayahuasca was shown to substantially reduce symptoms of 
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depression, including recurrent and treatment resistant depression (Johnson et 
al, 2019, pp.90-91).  Secondly, a meta-analysis of all studies that administered 
psilocybin, LSD or Ayahuasca to either healthy volunteers or those mental health 
difficulties – 549 participants in total – noted “large and statistically significant 
effects were detected for targeted symptoms,” with effects “on par or larger than 
achieved by psychotherapy relative to waitlist… and antidepressants relative to 
placebo” (Golberg et al, 2020, p.2661). Finally, the use of any of the classic 
psychedelics has been significantly associated with lower rates of mental health 
problems in large surveys of the general population, including “decreased 
likelihood of psychological distress and suicidality” and “a decreased risk of 
opioid abuse and dependence” (summary of studies in Johnson et al, 2019, 
p.89).   
It should also be noted that, aside from success in treating 
depression/anxiety related to life-threatening illness (for which anti-depressants 
and therapy have proven in meta-studies to be of little use: Agin-Liebes, 2020, 
pp.155-156), psilocybin has also shown three advantages over conventional 
treatment overall.  The first is absence of any lasting or significant side effects: 
while minor and transient adverse effects such as headaches, nausea, paranoia 
and emotional distress were reported during or shortly after treatment, nothing 
more significant was associated with ingestion of high dose psilocybin.  
Secondly, compared to anti-depressants, psilocybin is both safe and non-
addictive: there are no reported cases (not just in these studies, but also in any 
available research on drugs in general) of any fatalities associated with its use, 
and it rapidly stops working if one takes doses too closely together in time, so it is 
not possible to become dependent.  Finally, the anti-depressant and anxiolytic 
effects are immediate: there is no weeks-long wait to see whether the treatment 
is going to work (as in anti-depressants) or will power and effort needed to show 
up for and follow a course of therapy.  Thus, of the available interventions, even if 
subsequent studies fail to replicate effect sizes as large as reported so far, 
psilocybin would still enjoy a significant advantage over its conventional rivals.  
 
	 28	
3.2.3 What psilocybin does to your brain: 
Psilocybin, broken down in the body into psilocin, is a 5-HT (serotonin) 
agonist: its binding to and activation of the serotonin 2A receptors (5-HT2A) is 
what appears to initiate the acute psychedelic effects.  The activation of the 5-
HT2A receptors excites neural activity, enhancing global connectivity but 
weakening established modular connections that in ordinary waking 
consciousness organize the activity of the whole system.  In simplest terms, 
neurons that do not usually communicate form new connections all over the 
brain, while the established channels of neural activity disintegrate – which might 
be why one might have synesthesia-like experiences on high doses of 
psychedelics, as normally separate sensory pathways start to mingle, leading to, 
for instance, music being experienced as a tactile, as well as auditory, 
phenomenon. 
In particular, the default mode network (“DMN”) – implicated in a number 
of high-level brain functions, including self-consciousness, metacognition, 
counter-factual thinking, and moral judgment – becomes severely compromised 
under the effects of psilocybin.  This has led some researchers (notably, 
Carthart-Harris) to suggest the DMN as the neural basis of the Freudian ego, 
given the correlation between its dissolution and the “ego-death” experience 
frequently reported on psychedelics (see discussion in Carthart-Harris and 
Friston, 2019, pp.322-323; Carthart-Harris, 2019; and Muthukumaraswamy, 
2013).  The disintegration of modular/enhancement of global connectivity 
correlates with, and is thought to produce, the subjective effects of psychedelics 
– the altered states of consciousness typically experienced under their influence, 
including altered visual and auditory perception, time distortion, complex 
imagery, synesthesia, and mystical experiences; but also anxiety, dread, 
paranoia and other unpleasant sensations.  What kind of altered states are 
produced depends in a large measure on the “set and setting” of the psychedelic 
trip: the mindset of the subject and their social and physical environment, which 
might be thought about as the internal and external stimuli that steer the neural 
activity into particular directions.  Once the psychedelically active phase is over 
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(in five to six hours), modular connectivity is re-established and normal waking 
consciousness resumes: there is even some tentative fMRI evidence that 
modular connectivity might be somewhat strengthened post-psychedelic, with the 
DMN trending towards increased functional connectivity one day after ingestion 
of psilocybin (Carthart-Harris, 2017). 
It is notable that anti-depressants, although they are not direct agonists, 
also affect the serotonergic system: they inhibit the reabsorption of serotonin 
from the synapses, so that more serotonin in general becomes available to bind 
to its various receptors. As discussed above, it is not clear how or why this may 
have any anti-depressant/anxiolytic effect – the fourteen known serotonin 
receptors between them play a role in a huge range of biological functions, from 
aggression, through appetite to blood pressure and respiration, and what an 
increase in the availability of serotonin may or may not do to all of them (let alone 
how) is difficult to establish.  In any event, psilocybin does not increase serotonin 
levels, it just binds to serotonin receptors while it is available in the form of 
psilocin: that is, for the duration of the psychedelic experience, which lasts 
around six hours on a high dose.  That action is strictly temporary – it therefore 
cannot explain any enduring anti-depressant/anxiolytic effect, as most of the drug 
is eliminated from the body within 24 hours (Dinis-Oliveira, 2017).  The question 
therefore is what does produce that effect? 
 
3.3 The mystical experience as key to the therapeutic effect 
 A number of researchers have observed that the strength and endurance 
of the therapeutic effect is strongly correlated with the occurrence and intensity of 
a particular set of mental and phenomenal states that are reliably produced 
following ingestion of a high dose of psilocybin (as well as other psychedelics).  
This set of altered states of consciousness, which is profoundly meaningful and 
potentially transformative for the subject, came to be known as a “mystical 
experience,” given that outside the psychedelic context, it has been noted to 
appear more frequently, although not exclusively, in religious or spiritual settings. 
In research, the intensity of a mystical experience can be measured by scales 
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developed on the basis of its common or universal components, which have 
been identified by studying accounts of its spontaneous occurrences, and 
validated for reliability and reproducibility by psychology of religion scholars (see, 
for instance, Barrett and Griffiths, 2017, pp.6-7 regarding the Hood Mysticism 
Scale). For instance, the altered states of consciousness questionnaire (“ASC”) 
measures such items as experience of unity, spiritual experience, blissful state, 
and insightfulness.   
Research on psychedelic substances, including psilocybin, has in many 
instances included administering the ASC – and other relevant questionnaires, 
such as the Hood Mysticism Scale or the mystical states questionnaire (“MEQ”) - 
to subjects after the acute psychedelic phase has passed, to gauge whether and 
with what intensity a mystical experience has occurred.  A high score on this 
measure has been consistently predictive of long-term therapeutic outcomes, 
including alleviation or abatement of depression/anxiety symptoms. As no such 
specific correlation has been found between other elements of a psychedelic trip 
(for instance, altered visual and auditory perceptions, which also typically occur) 
and improvements in well being, Roseman et al (2017) have suggested that 
these results indicate that “the therapeutic effects of psilocybin are not a simple 
product of isolated pharmacological action but rather are experience dependent”   
(Roseman et al, 2017, pp.2 and 6, emphasis in the original). 
 
3.3.1 The phenomenology of a mystical experience:  
 Accounts of mystical experiences can be found in spiritual and religious 
literature all over the world.  Reported by saints, prophets, and mystics from a 
variety of world religions, sects and practices, all mystical experiences appear to 
share a common core of “phenomenological features that are independent from 
the interpretation of those experiences.”  The common core was 
comprehensively distilled from a variety of sources by Stace (1960), who 
identified “a sense of unity or the experience of becoming one with all that exists” 
as its crucial feature.  That sense of unity can be “extrovertive” – a “recognition of 
the oneness of all, in which one finds unity at the core of the inner subjectivity or 
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inner reality of all things despite the diversity or apparent individual identity and 
separation of all things;” or it can be “introvertive” – unity devoid of content, “an 
experience of complete dissolution of the self, loss of the notion of ‘I’ and loss of 
all boundaries, such that there is no separation or individual identity” (Barrett and 
Griffiths, 2017, pp.4-5; the introvertive kind is also often referred to as “ego 
death”). Participants in psilocybin trials appear to experience both kinds of unity 
as part of their mystical experiences - one participant, for instance, struggling to 
put it into words, said: “I was everybody, unity, one life with 6 billion faces, I was 
the one asking for love and giving love, I was swimming in the sea, and the sea 
was me.” For another, echoes of this sense of unity lasted for weeks – “I was 
absolutely connected to myself, to every living thing, to the universe” (Watts et al, 
2017, p.535). 
In addition to the sense of unity or oneness, common features of a 
mystical experience include: (1) sacredness – a sense of holiness of the 
experience, feelings of awe, reverence and wonder; (2) noetic quality – the sense 
that one is encountering the ultimate reality, more real than everyday reality, 
gaining meaningful insights and realizing truths; (3) transcendence of time and 
space; (4) deeply felt positive mood – blissfulness, tranquility, peace, ecstasy; (5) 
ineffability and paradoxicality – the inability to adequately describe the 
experience, and the sense that to do so, one would have to describe the 
existence of mutually exclusive states or concepts (Barrett and Griffiths, 2017, 
pp.4-5; Roseman et al, 2018, p.2).  For a few, the experience coalesces into 
feeling the presence of a god, or becoming one:  
“Not God in some dogmatic way, a God-like archetype within your psyche, 
that is real and within you.  I know this exists, I directly experienced it.  I 
was suddenly taken in a rapture and I was floating in midair, with my eyes 
wide open and my mouth open, completely in a state of awe and ecstasy” 
(Watts et al, 2017, p.535). 
  
What is striking about the phenomenology of the mystical experience is 
that it seems to be, in many important respects, the exact reverse of the 
phenomenology of depression/anxiety, reported by its sufferers (see 2.3 above).  
The constricted hyper-embodiment of depression that traps and isolates the 
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sufferer, disconnecting them from the world and others can be contrasted with 
the dissolution of boundaries and recognition of oneness and unity inherent in the 
mystical experience; the emotional flatness and anhedonia with the joyful bliss 
and deeply felt tranquility; the senselessness of existence with meaning, 
reverence, wonder and awe.  This contrast has not gone unnoticed by either the 
participants or the researchers involved in psilocybin studies.  For instance, 
participants in the psilocybin for treatment resistant depression studies 
(described above), who had felt their depression to be a mental prison, 
experienced a dramatic change under the influence of psilocybin: “It was like a 
holiday away from the prison of my brain, I was a ball of energy bouncing around 
the planet, I felt free, carefree, re-energised.”  Some felt as if their “brain was 
rebooted” or that the experience was “like the light switch being turned on in a 
dark house” (Watts et al, 2017, pp.528-529).   
Re-connection – to their senses, their selves, others, the world and nature 
- was a major theme of the experience for most, and reverberated for weeks or 
months afterwards.  Many – including those who had previously reported their 
senses as shut down or deteriorated - reported intense, even overwhelming, 
sensations during the psychedelic trip: “pure sensory, tactile, sexual bliss,” a 
“mental orgasm, a state of pure bliss and ecstasy that went on for hours and 
hours,” [t]he blissful feeing got more intense, really overwhelming, the glow grew 
until I was just that feeling, I had become bliss” (Watts et al, 2017, pp.530 and 
538). Some also claimed that the sensory experiences during the session “led to 
long term improvement in sensing” - increased ability to enjoy music or a 
regained aesthetic appreciation.  One of the participant, who had previously been 
unable to enjoy the beauty of her orchids said: 
“A veil dropped from my eyes, things were suddenly clear, glowing, bright.  
I looked at plants and felt their beauty.  I can still look at my orchids and 
experience that: that is the one thing that has really lasted” (Watts et al, 
2017, p.530; semi-structured interview six months after the experience) 
 
 In addition to reconnecting with their senses, for many participants, the 
lasting effect was a renewed ability to connect with a new sense of their own self 
	 33	
and with others.  This included not only realizations of self-worth and self-
compassion – realizing that one is a “good person,” “nurturing and protective,” 
feeling “confident, more resilient” – but also a strengthened bond with others that 
endured beyond the experience, along with an expanded emotional repertoire.  
For instance, one person enjoyed a dinner with his wife for the first time in six 
years; another reported “a general sense of ease and well-being when socializing 
with friends in situations that might have previously caused anxiety and 
discomfort;” other participants felt a “deep connection to everyone” including 
strangers and all of humanity.  Further, the experience also resulted in the 
participants being simply more interested in and engaged with their lives overall – 
rediscovering their enthusiasm about old hobbies, picking up new activities 
(getting new jobs, volunteering with refugees, starting dance classes, traveling) 
adjusting their lifestyles to reflect a new appreciation for their bodies (adopting a 
healthier diet, starting to exercise, etc.), and even adjusting their social circles “to 
allow for the changes within themselves” – establishing firmer boundaries and 
seeking out new friends who shared their values (Watts et al, 2017, pp.531-534). 
 Gaining meaningful insights was an important part of the mystical 
experience for many, reinforced perhaps by their noetic quality – feeling of “more 
real than reality” – that lent these realizations a profound ring of truth.  In addition 
to reporting new perspectives on themselves and their relationships with others – 
seeing them “clearly as if for the first time” or seeing “things as they really are” – 
some also made considerable progress concerning issues they considered 
directly related to their mental health.  One person was able to adopt a new 
perspective on a traumatic incident of childhood abuse perpetrated by his mother 
- he was able to re-frame the incident, perceiving his mother as no longer the 
embodiment of “an all powerful world and universe against me,” but rather a 
deeply unhappy person for whom he felt compassion (Watts et al, 2017, p.533).  
Others reported realizations around how their experiences of trauma informed 
their present difficulties: one person, for instance, recalled his parents scolding 
him for crying in the wake of a grandparent’s death, and realized not only how 
their attitude shaped his emotional habits but also that: “it’s not [a] weakness to 
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be emotional, that’s an unhealthy attitude” (Watts et al, 2017, p.539).  Many 
participants found a new acceptance of their emotions, even those that they saw 
as negative, that persisted beyond the experience even when their symptoms 
returned: 
“I took away from the experience that I used to get angry about having 
anxiety, now I think I can have the anxiety, I can just feel it and it will go, I 
don’t have to have the fear or run away” (Watts et al, 2017, p.541). 
 
 In light of the above accounts, it appears that the transformations of 
consciousness inherent in the mystical experience play a fundamental role in the 
therapeutic effects of psilocybin, continuing to exert a beneficial influence over 
the lives of sufferers long after the experience itself has ended.  But can this 
account accommodate the dramatic changes in neural activity observed during 
the course of a psychedelic trip?  The following chapter will discuss how the 
transformative effects of the mystical experience could be reflected in the neural 
activity from which consciousness and the self arise.  It will then examine how 
the account of depression/anxiety as part of the conscious self accommodates 
the evidence of the transformative effects of the mystical experience, and 
consider some objections to this view. 
 
4. Mental disorders as part of selfhood 
While theories of consciousness remain, in many respects, still in their 
infancy – leaving unanswered a number of fundamental questions, including how 
physical matter can produce subjective experience – it is nevertheless possible 
to draw some meaningful correlations between the operations of the brain and 
the emergence of the conscious self.  The discussion in this chapter will first 
focus on a theory of consciousness that seeks to explain how subjective 
experience might be produced by neural activity, in order to illustrate how such 
regular processes can also produce the kinds of mental suffering we know as 
depression/anxiety.  The alterations in consciousness typical of a mystical 
experience, and what the effect of those alterations on symptoms of 
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depression/anxiety means for the nature of mental illness, will then be analyzed 
in light of that theory. 
 A note about terminology: “consciousness” and “self” can have a number 
of meanings, and a detailed exposition of them all is beyond the scope of this 
paper.  For present purposes, “consciousness” and “subjective experience” will 
be used interchangeably to indicate all aspects of conscious experience (for a 
summary of different concepts of consciousness in neuroscience, see Atkinson 
et al, 2000).  The “self” or “selfhood” – in as much as it is a concept distinct from 
consciousness - can be taken to be, or be constructed from, the flow of 
conscious states.  It broadly encompasses two dimensions.  The first, the 
minimal or core self is the most basic, implicit and pre-reflective form of selfhood, 
one “that is present in every experience without requiring introspection,” and 
remains intact even if narrative memory is lost.  It encompasses the embodied 
and temporal dimensions, and is “bound to the background feeling of the body, 
mediated by proprioceptive and kinesthetic awareness.”  The second dimension 
of the self, the extended or narrative self is the autobiographical and 
intersubjective form of selfhood, embracing a number of higher-order capacities 
such as introspection, perspective taking, and the ability to feel self-reflective 
emotions such as shame or pride (Fuchs, 2010, pp.549-551).   
 
4.1 How consciousness can arise from neural connections: 
Scientific theories of consciousness generally proceed on the assumption 
(shared by this author) that all aspects of subjective experience arise from neural 
activity.  A number of theories aim to explain this process: some focus on a 
particular aspect of consciousness (such as Baars’ and Dehaene’s global 
workspace theory, which seems to primarily explain conscious awareness), while 
others are more holistic in trying to account for its implicit and explicit 
dimensions, as well as consciousness without awareness.  The major division 
seems to be between those theories that seek to explain consciousness as 
dependent on a module, neural pathway or process that specializes in its 
creation; and those that posit that it may arise from a specific process that may 
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take place anywhere in the brain (for a mapping of the different theories of 
consciousness, see Atkinson et al, 2000).  One of the latter theories, that 
nevertheless attempts to accommodate the former type, is Carrara-
Augustenborg’s Endogenous Feedback Network (“EFN”) theory, which will be 
adopted here as an illustrative example of how consciousness may arise as a 
product of neural activity.   
The EFN theory considers consciousness as emerging on a continuum, 
“ranging from complete inaccessibility to full awareness.”  The mechanism of that 
emergence can be summarized as follows: an internal or external stimulus (sight, 
sound, sensation, etc.) is detected by the sensory cells of the nervous system; 
this detection changes their firing rate, resulting in a signal that is forwarded both 
to specialized brain areas for cognitive and emotional processing, and across 
what is theorized to be a distinct neural network – the EFN.  The EFN is not 
involved in the signal’s processing; rather, it spreads the signal rapidly in a global 
broadcast across the whole network, potentially triggering certain responses 
based on a prior pattern of experience with similar stimuli.  The assessment of 
the stimulus is thus not solely performed by the specialized areas responsible for 
processing it, but is affected by (and affects) the predictions about the stimulus 
made across the EFN network, forming an interactive loop that produces a 
“perceptually unified but actually composite flow of information:” that is, 
consciousness (Carrara-Augustneborg, 2013, pp.2-4). 
The level of that consciousness is determined by the level of overall neural 
activity: only stimuli that reach a certain magnitude make it all the way into 
explicit conscious awareness.  This might be because they are particularly salient 
(sabre tooth tiger, leaping right at me!) or because they are amplified by the 
arousal of the EFN network (the brain already has a lot of information specific to 
the stimuli), or both.  How and whether we subjectively experience something is 
thus determined to a significant extent by not only how much it grabs our 
attention, but also by how much we already know about it  (Carrara-
Augustenborg, 2013, pp.2-4).  Further, the continuous feedback loop of 
integration of new stimuli with patterns of responses based on past experience 
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means that, on this view, our consciousness forms an incredibly complex, self-
adjusting system, unique to each person: continually modifying and re-organizing 
its network of neural interactions based on a particular pattern of prior 
experiences and reactions, as well as the current state of the system (Carrara-
Augustenborg, 2013, p.6).   
This system might be thought of as the basis for the individual self – with 
the minimal or core self-dimension corresponding to the more tacit levels of 
consciousness, and the expanded self perhaps conceptualized as closer to full, 
explicit conscious awareness.  That is not to say that our consciousness and our 
selves can simply be reduced to patterns of neural activity – there is nowhere 
near sufficient empirical evidence to make such an assertion, particularly as no 
one has any real idea of the mechanism through which neural activity might 
translate into the felt phenomenal quality of our experience of consciousness.  
However, the correlations established between neural activity and subjective 
experience are sufficient to say that whatever the latter is, it reflects and is 
reflected in the former.  The EFN’s “self-adjusting system” model provides us 
with one explanatory framework for how consciousness and the self develop and 
are structured on the level of neural connections, in a way that accounts for the 
full spectrum of conscious experience. 
 
4.2 Depression/anxiety as a part of the conscious self 
The development of depression/anxiety can easily be accommodated 
within the regular operations of such a self-adjusting system, without any need 
for dysfunction or abnormality.  Conscious experience of any kind relies on 
existing neural patterns established by a prior history of activation in response to 
stimuli already encountered, to process and predict responses to a new stimulus; 
but the new stimulus – if particularly salient and/or encountered often – will also 
cause the existing patterns to shift, and the system to alter. The development of 
depression/anxiety could therefore be seen as simply the build-up and 
reinforcement of particular neural patterns of responses that shape 
consciousness in a certain way.  This could happen slowly, over the course of 
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many years of small adjustments that build up to a first episode of major 
depression; or it could be brought about by a dramatic alteration of the system 
through a particularly salient event (such as trauma), where the alteration 
becomes strengthened or fixed by the pattern of behaviors, emotions, sensations 
and cognitions that follow in its wake.  Depression/anxiety can be seen on this 
view as a particular configuration of the conscious system – a part of the 
conscious self - that builds up and becomes firmly established, shaped by the 
particular history of the sufferer: their propensity to respond a certain way to 
events or other stimuli, their prior experiences, habits, social and physical 
environment, etc.  This appears congruent with the current thinking on how 
depression/anxiety (or any other mental disorder) develop - through a complex 
combination of genetic propensities, social and cultural context, and the 
particular history and personality of the individual sufferer.   
If this view is right, it would explain both the therapeutic effects of the 
mystical experience and why these effects prove lasting for some, but not all, 
sufferers.  As set out above (at 3.2.3), the occurrence of the mystical experience 
dramatically alters the landscape of neural connections – disabling existing 
pathways that normally regulate activity and allowing a great number of new 
neural connections to form, shaping conscious experience in a way that appears 
to be (based on the accounts set out above) opposite from that experienced in 
depression.  Given the emotional and personal intensity of the mystical 
experience, these new patterns would appear to be highly salient: the view of 
consciousness as a self-adjusting system would therefore predict that they would 
have a substantial impact on the whole system as they become integrated within 
it.  When normal waking consciousness resumes, the new patterns of 
connections would remain part of the prior history of activation on the basis of 
which incoming stimuli are assessed, continuing to have an impact on subjective 
experience.  However, their impact would depend on two factors: first, how well 
the new connections are integrated with the rest of the system (perhaps through 
recalling the experience, writing about it, sharing it with others informally or in 
therapy - which are all activities generally recommended in the wake of the 
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mystical experience); and second, how well the new pattern is reinforced, as 
opposed to returned to its former depressive form, in the weeks and months that 
follow the mystical experience.  This might be why the beneficial effects do no 
last for some of the sufferers: the return to their usual habits, behaviors, and 
lifestyles might continue to activate much of the pre-treatment neural pattern, 
strengthening and re-establishing it and, on the subjective level, causing the 
depression/anxiety to return.   
 
4.2.1 Can competing accounts of mental suffering explain the effects of the 
mystical experience? 
Described both at the level of subjective experience and at the level of 
neural activity, the therapeutic effect of the mystical experience can be explained 
as achieved primarily through a transformation or alteration of the conscious self, 
supporting the “self-model” of mental suffering.  But can competing models – the 
medical model of discrete disorders or the social model of disorders as mere 
social constructs – also explain these beneficial effects? 
In my view, both would struggle to do so.  On the version of the medical 
model in which mental disorders are caused by some organic dysfunction or 
abnormality, it is difficult to see how a single, transient psychological 
phenomenon – however intense – could achieve much to transform the organic 
basis upon which the disorder is purportedly based. It is also unlikely that the 
therapeutic effect could be attributed to the biochemical agent – psilocybin – 
through the operation of which the mystical experience is initiated, given that the 
drug in question is active for only several hours.  A version of the medical model 
in which some mental states are in themselves considered disordered (without 
any need for reference to an organic abnormality) might be able to account for 
the effects of the mystical experience: the mental states in question would also 
have neural correlates, which would be affected by the global increase in neural 
connectivity and disengagement of established neural networks during a 
psychedelic trip, in a way that might modify the disordered states in question.  
However, this argument is conceptually unattractive: on the one hand, one would 
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have to assert that such disordered states can be disassociated from one’s 
conscious self, yet on the other propose that they are altered as part of a 
phenomenon in which the whole conscious self is profoundly transformed.  It 
seems to me that any admission of the latter would substantially weaken the 
argument for any boundary between one’s self and one’s mental disorder. 
The social account of mental illness would seem to fare even worse.  As 
previously mentioned, the strong version of anti-psychiatry conceptualizes mental 
disorders as oppressive social constructs: thus the effects of an entirely mental 
phenomenon such as a mystical experience, which does not operate in the social 
sphere, seem unlikely to be explained by such an account. Even if we take a 
weaker version of this view – in which painful mental states are shaped primarily 
through social and cultural factors – given that those social forces remain 
unaltered by the mystical experience of an individual sufferer, this type of 
account is still not promising as an explanatory framework for the therapeutic 
effects in question.  
 
4.3 Objections 
 There are two main objections that can be put to the thesis pursued in this 
paper.  First, the basis for the argument is that the therapeutic effects of 
psilocybin are due to the mystical experience that occurs during the acute 
psychedelic phase of the drug’s operation.  While, as set out above, this is 
supported by a correlation established in empirical research carried out so far, 
when more extensive research is completed, the correlation may disappear; or 
some other mechanism for achieving the therapeutic effect may be discovered.  
There is already at least one researcher (Olson, 2021) who argues that it is 
psychedelics’ ability to promote neural plasticity, rather than any alterations in 
conscious experience, that may be the main mechanism through which the 
therapeutic effect is achieved – he proposes administering psychedelics to 
subjects under anesthesia to test whether they will still experience comparable 
relief in symptoms of mental disorders without going through the mystical 
experience.  Advancing the contrary view in response to Olson, Yaden and 
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Griffiths (2021) argue – on the basis of the correlation already discussed - that 
the subjective effects are in fact necessary for the therapeutic effects of 
psychedelics be produced; though they agree with Olson that administering 
psychedelics to anesthetized patients might be needed to definitively settle this 
dispute.  If Olson proves to be correct, or if some other therapeutic mechanism of 
psilocybin is discovered, the argument presented by this thesis will naturally need 
to be either abandoned or substantially revised.  However, at the moment, there 
is no empirical research to that effect; further, given that the correlation in 
question is so specific – relating the therapeutic effects of psychedelics not to just 
any and all of their subjective effects but rather, specifically to the mystical 
experience – it seems unlikely that Olson is correct. 
 The second objection that could be put forward is that this argument might 
not generalize to other types of mental suffering, including other disorders 
categorized by the DSM.  It could be that depression/anxiety is a special case, 
and other mental disorders cannot be conceptualized as part of the conscious 
self.  I consider this very unlikely, in light of the high comorbidity between mental 
disorders and other evidence (including from genetic studies: see for instance, 
Howard et al, 2019) that shows that much of what we consider mental illness has 
common developmental roots – there is therefore little reason to suspect that 
depression/anxiety is not representative of mental illness overall.  Further, other 
researchers have already advanced convincing arguments in favor of the self-
model of mental illness for other mental disorders, including schizophrenia – 
Sass and Parnas (2003), for instance, persuasively argue that schizophrenia 
should primarily be understood as an alteration, or disturbance in the structures 
that underpin minimal or core selfhood (ipseity). 
 
5. Conclusion 
  Having only recommenced in the last two decades, empirical research on 
psychedelic substances, such as psilocybin, has already made good progress 
towards not only establishing a new treatment paradigm for mental disorders, but 
also in helping to answer the question that is central to philosophy of mental 
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health: what is mental illness?  The fact that the therapeutic effects of psilocybin 
in alleviating symptoms of depression and anxiety can be traced clearly to the 
intensity of a particular type of altered state of consciousness experienced during 
the currency of the acute psychedelic phase, indicates that depression and 
anxiety – and perhaps, all mental illness – is primarily a part of the conscious 
self, rather than a pathological invasion of it or the product of oppressive social 
forces.  There appears to be nothing other than a profound alteration of 
consciousness that could account for the therapeutic effect of psilocybin: the 
drug itself ceases to have any effect in a matter of hours; and the neuronal 
hyper-connectivity it excites on the level of the brain returns to normal around the 
same time.   
The accounts of those who had undergone the “mystical experience” on 
psilocybin testify to its transformative power: in particular, the phenomenological 
descriptions of the experience by depression/anxiety sufferers seem to clearly 
attribute any lasting therapeutic changes to the profound intensity of sensations 
and insights gained during the course of the mystical experience.  Further, it 
seem that the changes seen in neural connections during the acute phase of 
psilocybin may be able to effect longer-term re-configurations in the neural 
networks from which consciousness emerges, through the ordinary mechanisms 
that shape the conscious self.  It therefore seems that the evidence at both 
subjective (mind) and objective (brain) levels is that the therapeutic effect can be 
accounted for solely, or primarily, by the transformation of consciousness; and if 
that is so, it would support the idea that depression/anxiety should be 
conceptualized as part of the conscious self – however painful, disturbing or 
alienating it may be. 
 
5.1 Suggestions for future research 
In terms of future research, at least two directions can be suggested.  
First, while this paper has operated under premise that what can be said of 
psilocybin in relation to depression/anxiety is likely to be broadly applicable to all 
classic psychedelics in relation to many other forms of mental illness, more in-
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depth research is needed to test this assumption.  In particular, the relationship 
between schizophrenia and psychedelics should prove particularly interesting, 
given that, on the one hand, the similarities in phenomenology might make 
psychedelics unsuitable as a therapy for this set of mental states, while on the 
other, the common genetic underpinnings between depression and 
schizophrenia might suggest that the same therapeutic mechanism should work 
for both. 
A second direction one might take in future research in to explore the 
implications of viewing depression/anxiety – and any other mental illness – as 
part of the conscious self.  For instance, if mental illness is conceptualized as a 
particular configuration of, or within, the conscious self, is that self pathological or 
otherwise ill in some way?  On the one hand, the depressed person suffers just 
as much, if not more, as anyone with a physical ailment, and it seems that should 
somehow be recognized.  On the other, in the absence of a strongly principled 
basis upon which to make the distinction between “healthy” and “ill” when it 
comes to mental health, illness assumes a dangerous role in attaching to 
persons, rather than just impersonal biological or psychological processes, 
tainting with sense of abnormality those aspects of a person’s selfhood that 
society finds uncomfortable or otherwise normatively deviant.  Another problem 
that could be explored in further research is the ethical implication of this view for 
medicating mental distress with psychoactive drugs, such as anti-depressants, 












This paper examines the implications of the recent research on psychedelic 
substances and their effects on mental health.  Specifically, the paper analyzes 
the findings concerning the correlation between a particular state of 
consciousness reliably induced by ingestion of psychedelics – the so-called 
“mystical experience” – and long-term improvements in mental health.  The 
central thesis pursued is that the “self-model” of mental suffering – the view that 
mental illness should be understood primarily as part of that flow of subjective 
experience that human consciousness and selfhood are grounded in – best 
accommodates the evidence from psychedelic research, which indicates that the 
therapeutic effects of psychedelics are achieved through a profound alteration in 
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